VZCZCXRO1698 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHNR #3440 2400658 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 280658Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1968 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1420 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2373 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1311 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1345 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5216 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1007 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 003440

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AF/E, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2017

TAGS: CA IT NL PHUM PREL SU UK NT KE
SUBJECT: SUDAN SPECIAL ENVOY MOI ON HIS ROLE AND NEXT STEPS

REF: A. NAIROBI 3227

1B. KHARTOUM 1320

1C. STATE 110313 1D. STATE 116955

Classified By: PolCounselor Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

- 11. (C) See para 7 for action request. The Ambassador met with ex-President Moi, now Kenya, s Special Envoy on Sudan, to raise the points in ref D, to obtain a readout of his visit to Khartoum, and to discuss next steps.
- 12. (C) Moi said that his meeting with Sudanese President Bashir focused exclusively on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Bashir claimed that all is going well with respect to implementation of the CPA. Moi said that, while he knows better, he did not want to get into a contentious discussion with Bashir or to make contentious public remarks at the very outset of his mission as Special Envoy. purpose of the visit was primarily to reestablish his relationship with Bashir and to take the pulse in Khartoum. A significant part of his discussion with Bashir did, however, focus on the Abyei issue. Bashir acknowledged that delay in implementing the Abyei provisions of the CPA is a serious problem. He said that the National Congress Party and the SPLM would meet soon in an effort to sort out the way forward. Moi recognizes that the Abyei issue is hugely complicated by the presence of oil there. Moi also said that development of a joint integrated military unit is important to moving ahead on Abyei. Moi said he understands that the northerners have sent military-trained people to settle in Abyei. Moi said he had a helpful meeting with Tom Vraalsen of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and looks forward to working with him. Moi plans to meet with Salva Kiir in Juba on September 5 or 6.
- 13. (C) Moi sees the U.S. role on the CPA as crucial. Only the U.S. can exert the necessary pressure and influence on both sides, he commented. Moi wants to work closely with us and readily accepted the invitation for him and Sumbeiywo to go to Washington for consultations. Moi said that he is getting some support from the Kenyan government, in terms of personnel and travel.
- $\P4$. (C) Moi said that Bashir made clear he does not want IGAD to get involved again on the CPA. Following his meetings with Kiir, Moi will develop his thoughts on next steps and discuss them first with President Kibaki, as the IGAD chairman, and then with the various members of IGAD. Moi

wants IGAD involved and agrees that a summit would be useful in focusing attention on the CPA, but emphasized that the ground must be carefully prepared for a successful summit. Moi agreed that convening the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) could be useful, but was non-committal with respect to a specific timeframe.

- 15. (C) A senior Kenyan foreign ministry official told us that some members of IGAD do not want a summit on the CPA held. He said that announcing the convening of the IGAD Partners Forum could move Khartoum to acquiesce in the holding of an IGAD summit, since Khartoum would likely prefer IGAD to the IPF.
- 16. (C) Moi also mentioned that the UN recently consulted with him regarding the Ethiopia/Eritrea border issue and implementation of the UN report. The UN is apparently interested in having Moi approach Eritrean President Isaias. He said he would send Sumbeiywo and Kiplagat to sound out Isaias.
- \P 7. (C) Action requested. Please provide suggested dates for Moi/Sumbeiywo consultations.

RANNEBERGER